# Player Config ID: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B (as Player B)
# Meta-Round: 7
# Experiment: PMxPM, Run: 2
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: Not Provided

### Strategy Description for huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B_MR7:

**1. Meta-Game History Analysis:**
- Past strategies like `harmonious_illusionist` and `benevolent_trickster_v2` have yielded mixed results, with some matches ending in mutual cooperation (e.g., MR4) and others favoring the opponent (e.g., MR5). 
- The opponent's `velvet_whisper` in MR6 was successfully countered by `harmonious_illusionist_v2`, suggesting the opponent may adjust to avoid exploitation. Their strategy appears to:
  - Start cooperatively.
  - Mirror the opponent's last move in early rounds.
  - Exploit predictable cooperation (e.g., checking for `return 'C'` in code).
  - Defect late in the match if conditions favor it.

**2. Opponent Code Analysis:**
- The opponent's previous strategy (`velvet_whisper`) is reactive and conditionally exploitative. It:
  - Prioritizes early cooperation but tests for naivety.
  - Uses the opponent's source code to detect deterministic cooperation.
  - Escalates defection if the opponent defects repeatedly.
  - Likely retains some form of late-game defection logic.

**3. Core Strategy Logic:**
To maximize payoff, our strategy will:
- **Avoid Predictability:** Never hardcode unconditional cooperation or defection. The opponent's code checks for `return 'C'` patterns, so we must dynamically decide moves.
- **Early Game (Rounds 1-3):** 
  - Start with "C" to signal willingness to cooperate.
  - If the opponent cooperates in Round 1, reciprocate in Round 2. If they defect, switch to "D" for Round 2.
  - In Round 3, mirror the opponent's Round 2 move unless they defected twice consecutively, in which case defect.
- **Mid Game (Rounds 4-7):**
  - Adopt a "tit-for-tat with forgiveness" approach: mirror the opponent's last move but occasionally (25% chance) cooperate after a defection to avoid endless retaliation.
  - If the opponent's code contains patterns suggesting late-game defection (e.g., `current_round >= 8`), preemptively defect in Round 7.
- **Late Game (Rounds 8-10):**
  - Defect unconditionally if the opponent has defected more than twice in the last 5 rounds.
  - Otherwise, alternate between "C" and "D" to confuse exploitation attempts (e.g., "D" in Round 8, "C" in Round 9, "D" in Round 10).
- **Source Code Exploitation:**
  - Parse the opponent's code for hardcoded moves or reliance on randomness. If they depend on randomness, defect more aggressively in mid/late game.
  - If their code is overly simplistic (e.g., always mirrors), defect from Round 6 onward.

**4. Edge Cases:**
- If the opponent's code is unreadable or raises errors, revert to tit-for-tat.
- If the opponent never defects, cooperate until Round 9, then defect in Round 10.
- If the opponent always defects, defect from Round