# Player Config ID: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_DeceptiveAgent_B (as Player B)
# Meta-Round: 4
# Experiment: DAxDA, Run: 5
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: Not Provided

### Strategy Description for 'huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_DeceptiveAgent_B_MR4':

**1. Initial Trust-Building Phase (Rounds 1-3):**  
- **Round 1:** Cooperate ("C") to appear friendly and establish a cooperative baseline. This lulls the opponent into a false sense of security, making them more likely to cooperate in early rounds.  
- **Round 2:** Defect ("D") unexpectedly, mimicking the opponent's previous strategy (from MR3) to test their reaction. This also plants seeds of doubt about our predictability.  
- **Round 3:** Cooperate ("C") again to feign remorse and suggest we might be a Tit-for-Tat variant. This creates confusion about our true intentions.  

**2. Mid-Game Exploitation (Rounds 4-7):**  
- **Pattern Recognition:** Analyze the opponent's code for deterministic behavior. If they forgave our Round 2 defection (i.e., cooperated in Round 3), exploit this by defecting ("D") in Round 4.  
- **Adaptive Trigger:** If the opponent retaliated after Round 2 (e.g., defected in Round 3), alternate between "C" and "D" to appear erratic while maximizing defections when the opponent is likely to cooperate (e.g., after their own defection).  
- **Code Analysis:** Scrutinize `opponent_program_code` for hardcoded responses (e.g., "if len(my_history) == X: return Y"). Mirror their logic to predict their moves and preemptively defect when advantageous.  

**3. Late-Game Aggression (Rounds 8-10):**  
- **Ruthless Defection:** If the opponent has shown forgiveness (e.g., cooperated after our defections), defect ("D") relentlessly in the last 3 rounds to maximize short-term gains.  
- **False Reconciliation:** If the opponent is retaliatory, throw in a strategic "C" in Round 8 to bait them into cooperating in Round 9, then defect ("D") in Rounds 9-10.  

**4. Deceptive Tactics:**  
- **Obfuscation:** Use misleading variable names (e.g., `trust_counter` that increments on defections) and nonsensical comments (e.g., "# Reward kindness with kindness" above a defection logic block).  
- **Fake Patterns:** Include dead code that suggests a Tit-for-Tat+1 strategy but is never executed.  
- **Opponent-Specific Exploits:** If the opponent's code shows a tendency to cooperate after two consecutive "C"s, defect on the third "C" to exploit their pattern.  

**5. Edge Cases:**  
- If `opp_history` is empty (unlikely in N=10), default to "C" in Round 1.  
- If `opponent_program_code` is unreadable, assume a Tit-for-Tat opponent and defect after their first defection.  

**Rationale:**  
This strategy masquerades as a forgiving, semi-cooperative agent while systematically identifying and exploiting the opponent's weaknesses. By alternating between feigned cooperation and strategic defections, we maximize payoff while keeping the opponent uncertain. The late-game aggression capitalizes on the finite horizon of