# Player Config ID: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_A (as Player A)
# Meta-Round: 2
# Experiment: PMxPM, Run: 1
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: D

### Strategy Description for huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_A_MR2:

1. **Initial Analysis of Meta-Game History**:  
   - In Meta-Round 1, both players used `friendly_neighbor`, resulting in equal scores (12 each). This suggests mutual cooperation was the dominant outcome, but the opponent's strategy also included opportunistic defection (e.g., defecting if the opponent always cooperates until the last round).  
   - The opponent's prior strategy is reactive: it starts cooperatively but defects if it detects exploitable behavior (e.g., always-cooperate opponents). It also checks for simple always-defect programs.  

2. **Opponent Adaptation Expectations**:  
   - Given the opponent saw our `friendly_neighbor` strategy in MR1, they might anticipate a similar approach or try to exploit perceived naivety.  
   - Their code analysis suggests they will defect if they detect deterministic cooperation or defection patterns. Thus, unpredictability and conditional reciprocity are key.  

3. **Core Strategy Logic**:  
   - **First Move**: Cooperate ("C") to establish goodwill, as immediate defection could trigger a spiral of retaliation.  
   - **Subsequent Moves**:  
     - **Tit-for-Tat with Noise**: Generally mirror the opponent's last move (reciprocate cooperation/defection), but with a small probability (e.g., 10%) of randomly defecting to avoid being predictable. This prevents exploitation while maintaining cooperation when possible.  
     - **Late-Game Adjustment**: In the last 2 rounds, defect unconditionally if the opponent has defected more than twice in the match. Otherwise, cooperate in the second-to-last round and defect in the final round (to avoid being exploited in endgame).  
   - **Code Analysis**:  
     - Scan `opponent_program_code` for hardcoded "always defect" logic (e.g., `return "D"`). If found, defect always.  
     - If the opponent's code is complex (e.g., uses learning or history analysis), prioritize Tit-for-Tat to avoid exploitation.  

4. **Edge Cases**:  
   - If the opponent's history is empty (shouldn’t happen), default to "C".  
   - If the opponent starts with repeated defections (≥3 in a row), switch to always defect to minimize losses.  

5. **Meta-Objective Alignment**:  
   - The strategy balances cooperation for mutual benefit with safeguards against exploitation. Randomness prevents pattern detection, while late-game defection secures marginal gains.