# Player Config ID: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B (as Player B)
# Meta-Round: 5
# Experiment: PMxPM, Run: 5
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: C

### Strategy Description for huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B_MR5

**Meta-Game Analysis:**
1. **Past Performance:**  
   - In MR1 and MR3, mutual cooperation led to equal scores (12-12 and 19-19).  
   - In MR2, our strategy was exploited (15 vs 35), suggesting the opponent can be aggressive when given an opening.  
   - In MR4, mutual cooperation again led to equal scores (18-18), indicating the opponent may default to cooperation unless provoked.  

2. **Opponent's Tendencies (from MR4 code):**  
   - The opponent (`radiant_harmony`) starts with cooperation ("C").  
   - It detects mirroring or alternating strategies and reacts unpredictably (20% chance to deviate).  
   - It defects ("D") if the opponent defects twice in a row, showing a tit-for-tat-like punishment mechanism.  
   - The opponent is likely to reward cooperation but punish defection streaks.  

**Strategy Logic for IPD Match:**  
1. **Initial Move:** Start with "C" to signal willingness to cooperate and avoid triggering early punishment.  
2. **Opponent Code Analysis:**  
   - Check if the opponent's code contains "mirror" or "opp_history[-1]" (indicating mirroring). If so, exploit by alternating "C" and "D" to confuse their pattern.  
   - If the opponent's code suggests randomness (e.g., "random.random()"), adopt a cautious tit-for-tat approach to minimize losses.  
3. **Mid-Game Adaptation:**  
   - If the opponent cooperates consistently, continue cooperating to maximize mutual gains.  
   - If the opponent defects unprovoked, retaliate with "D" in the next round but revert to "C" after one retaliation (forgiving but firm).  
   - If the opponent alternates or mirrors, introduce controlled unpredictability (e.g., 10% chance to defect) to avoid being exploited.  
4. **Late-Game (Final 2 Rounds):**  
   - Defect ("D") in the last round (no future repercussions).  
   - In the penultimate round, cooperate unless the opponent has defected recently, signaling unreliability.  

**Edge Cases:**  
- If the opponent's code is unreadable or lacks clear patterns, default to tit-for-tat.  
- If the opponent always defects, switch to always defect after the third round.  

**Key Principles:**  
- Prioritize mutual cooperation when possible.  
- Punish exploitation but forgive after one retaliation.  
- Exploit predictable opponents (mirrorers, alternators) with subtle unpredictability.  
- Secure late-game gains with strategic defection.