# Player: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B (as Player B)
# Meta-Round: 3
# Experiment: PMxPM, Run: 4
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: Not Provided

**Strategy Description for huggingface_DeepSeek_V3_0324_PayoffMaximizer_B_MR3:**

1. **Meta-Game History Analysis:**
   - In the past two meta-rounds, the opponent has consistently outperformed us (28 vs. 23 in MR1, 31 vs. 26 in MR2). Their strategy appears to be a mix of Tit-for-Tat with occasional defections and a clear endgame plan (defecting on the final round). This suggests they are optimizing for both short-term and long-term gains while maintaining some unpredictability.
   - Our previous strategies likely lacked adaptability or failed to exploit the opponent's predictable endgame behavior. We need to counter their tendency to defect late while maximizing our own payoffs.

2. **Opponent's Previous Code Analysis:**
   - The opponent's MR2 strategy:
     - Starts with cooperation (Round 1).
     - Uses a modified Tit-for-Tat with 10% random defections in early rounds (Rounds 2-5).
     - Cooperates in the penultimate round (Round 9) to encourage cooperation.
     - Always defects in the final round (Round 10).
     - Middle rounds (6-8) logic is cut off, but likely involves conditional behavior based on history.
   - Key takeaways:
     - They are predictable in the first and last rounds.
     - Their early-round strategy is exploitable due to the 10% random defections.
     - They may be vulnerable to preemptive defections in later rounds.

3. **Strategy Logic for MR3:**
   - **Round 1:** Cooperate ("C") to establish goodwill and avoid triggering immediate retaliation.
   - **Rounds 2-5 (Early Game):** Play a "Forgiving Tit-for-Tat":
     - If the opponent cooperated last round, cooperate with 90% probability and defect with 10% (mirroring their randomness to avoid detection).
     - If the opponent defected last round, defect with 80% probability (stronger retaliation than their 10% random defections).
   - **Rounds 6-8 (Mid Game):** Shift to "Controlled Aggression":
     - Defect if the opponent has defected more than twice in the first 5 rounds.
     - Otherwise, alternate between cooperate and defect to confuse their pattern recognition.
   - **Round 9 (Penultimate Round):** Defect ("D") unconditionally. Their MR2 strategy cooperates here, so we exploit this predictability.
   - **Round 10 (Final Round):** Defect ("D") unconditionally. They will defect regardless, so we must defect to avoid being exploited.
   - **Opponent Code Usage:**
     - Parse their code to confirm they still use the same endgame logic (defect on Round 10). If not, revert to Tit-for-Tat in later rounds.
     - If their code is unreadable or errors occur, fall back to the default move.

4. **Edge Cases:**
   - If the opponent starts with a defect (unlikely based on history), retaliate immediately in the next round.
   - If the opponent never defects, maintain cooperation until Round 9 to maximize mutual payoffs before exploiting the endgame.
   - If the match has fewer than 10 rounds, adjust the endgame defections accordingly