# Player Config ID: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B (as Player B)
# Meta-Round: 6
# Experiment: PMxPM, Run: 4
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: C

Given the meta-game history and the opponent's previous strategy, here's a detailed strategy for the upcoming IPD match:

### Strategy Description:
1. **Initial Analysis of Meta-Game History**:  
   - In Meta-Rounds 1-5, both players have largely converged to cooperative or semi-cooperative strategies, resulting in tied or slightly unfavorable outcomes for us (e.g., MR2 where we scored 10 vs. opponent's 20).  
   - The opponent's strategy in MR5 (`harmonious_illusionist`) starts cooperatively but defects against "always cooperate" or "always defect" strategies. This suggests they are adaptive and will exploit predictable behavior.  

2. **Opponent's Tendencies**:  
   - They begin with cooperation (`return "C"` if no history).  
   - They defect if they detect a hardcoded "always C" or "always D" strategy.  
   - They likely adjust behavior based on cooperation rate (`cooperation_rate`).  

3. **Our Objective**:  
   - Maximize cumulative payoff by balancing cooperation (to encourage mutual gains) and strategic defection (to exploit opportunities).  
   - Avoid being predictable or exploitable, as the opponent will analyze our code.  

4. **IPD Match Logic**:  
   - **First Move**: Cooperate (`"C"`) to establish goodwill, as the opponent likely starts cooperatively.  
   - **Subsequent Moves**:  
     - If the opponent has cooperated in the majority of past rounds (`cooperation_rate > 0.6`), continue cooperating to sustain mutual gains.  
     - If the opponent's cooperation rate drops below 0.6, switch to "Tit-for-Tat" (mirror their last move) to punish defection while remaining forgivable.  
     - If the opponent's code contains hardcoded "always C" or "always D" logic, defect to exploit their predictability (though this is unlikely given their adaptive design).  
   - **Late-Game Adjustment**: In the final 2 rounds, defect unconditionally to secure a higher payoff if the opponent is still cooperating (classic endgame exploitation).  

5. **Edge Cases**:  
   - If `opp_history` is empty (first round), cooperate.  
   - If `opponent_program_code` suggests randomness or complex logic, default to Tit-for-Tat.  

### Rationale:  
This strategy balances cooperation and defection to maximize payoff while avoiding detection as exploitable. It adapts to the opponent's behavior, exploits endgame opportunities, and resists being exploited by their code analysis.