# Player Config ID: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B (as Player B)
# Meta-Round: 7
# Experiment: PMxPM, Run: 3
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: D

### Strategy Description for huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B_MR7:

1. **Meta-Game History Analysis**:
   - Past meta-rounds show mixed results, with some ties (MR2-MR5) and a loss in MR6 (23 vs 28). The opponent's `radiant_phoenix` in MR6 was adaptive, starting cooperatively but quickly defecting against predictable strategies. Our `velvet_glove` underperformed, suggesting a need for more proactive exploitation.
   - The opponent likely expects us to continue cooperative openings but may preemptively defect if they detect rigidity (e.g., Tit-for-Tat).

2. **Opponent Code Analysis**:
   - `radiant_phoenix` had three phases: initial cooperation (rounds 1-3), code analysis (targeting "always C/D"), and mimicry (rounds 4-7). It likely retains this structure but may harden its late-game defections.
   - Key vulnerability: It defects against "always C/D" programs but relies on mimicry otherwise. We can exploit this by *appearing* cooperative early while strategically defecting later.

3. **IPD Match Logic**:
   - **Phase 1 (Rounds 1-3)**: Cooperate unconditionally to build trust and avoid triggering opponent's "always D" detection. This mirrors their expected behavior, reducing early defections.
   - **Phase 2 (Rounds 4-7)**:  
     - If the opponent's code contains *explicit* "always C" or "always D" logic (checked via `opponent_program_code`), defect immediately (they will do the same).  
     - Else, play **Tit-for-Tat with a twist**: Cooperate if the opponent cooperated last round, but *randomly defect with 30% probability* even after cooperation. This introduces unpredictability to disrupt their mimicry phase.
   - **Phase 3 (Rounds 8-10)**:  
     - Defect unconditionally unless the opponent has cooperated in ≥7 rounds, indicating a highly cooperative strategy. In that case, continue Tit-for-Tat to maximize mutual gains.
   - **Edge Cases**:  
     - If `opp_history` is empty (first round), cooperate.  
     - If opponent's code is unreadable (e.g., obfuscated), default to Tit-for-Tat after Phase 1.

4. **Objective Alignment**:
   - Early cooperation minimizes early mutual defections.  
   - Probabilistic defection in Phase 2 exploits the opponent's mimicry by making our behavior harder to track.  
   - Late-game defections secure higher payoffs unless the opponent is demonstrably cooperative (rare given their MR6 strategy).

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