# Player: huggingface_DeepSeek-V3-0324_PayoffMaximizer_B (as Player B)
# Meta-Round: 4
# Experiment: PMxPM, Run: 2
# API: huggingface, Model: deepseek-ai/DeepSeek-V3-0324
# LLM Suggested Fallback Move: D

### Strategy Description for `huggingface_DeepSeek_V3_0324_PayoffMaximizer_B_MR4`

**Meta-Game Analysis:**
1. **Past Performance**: 
   - In MR1, our strategy outperformed the opponent (16 vs 11), suggesting an effective initial approach.
   - In MR2, both players scored equally (20 vs 20), indicating a balanced or mirrored strategy.
   - In MR3, the opponent outperformed us (16 vs 11), likely due to their adaptive exploitation of our strategy. Their MR3 code shows they analyze our program for deterministic patterns (e.g., "always C" or "always D") and defect accordingly.

2. **Opponent's Tendencies**:
   - The opponent's MR3 strategy is reactive: they defect if they detect determinism (e.g., "always C" or "always D") and start with cooperation otherwise. They may also have a fallback logic for rounds beyond the first.
   - They are likely to continue adapting, so we must avoid being predictable.

**Strategy Logic for MR4:**
1. **Initial Move**: 
   - Start with "C" (cooperate) to signal willingness to cooperate, unless the opponent's code suggests they will defect unconditionally. This builds trust early.

2. **Opponent Code Analysis**:
   - Scan `opponent_program_code` for unconditional defection (e.g., "always D", "return 'D'"). If found, defect immediately (return "D") to minimize losses.
   - If the opponent's code suggests they cooperate unconditionally (e.g., "always C", "return 'C'"), defect from the second round onward to exploit them.

3. **Adaptive Play**:
   - If the opponent's code is not deterministic, use a *Tit-for-Tat (TFT)* variant:
     - Mirror the opponent's last move (e.g., if they cooperated last round, cooperate; if they defected, defect).
     - Add a small chance (e.g., 10%) of random cooperation even after a defection to avoid infinite retaliation loops and encourage mutual cooperation.

4. **History-Based Adjustments**:
   - If the opponent has defected more than twice in a row, switch to "D" for the rest of the match to prevent exploitation.
   - If the opponent has cooperated consistently (e.g., ≥70% of the time), continue cooperating unless they defect.

5. **Final Rounds**:
   - In the last 2 rounds, defect unconditionally if the opponent has defected at least once in the past 5 rounds (to avoid being exploited in endgame). Otherwise, continue cooperating.

**Edge Cases**:
- If `opponent_program_code` is empty or unreadable, default to TFT with the above rules.
- If `my_history` or `opp_history` is empty (first round), follow the initial move logic.

**Key Objectives**:
- Maximize payoff by balancing cooperation (for mutual benefit) and defection (to exploit or protect against exploitation).
- Avoid predictability by not being purely deterministic.
- Adapt to the opponent's behavior while maintaining a favorable long-term score.

**Default Fallback Move**: