

A Appendix

A.1 Additional experiments testing the robustness of naturally trained meta-learning models

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat} MI	\mathcal{A}_{adv} MI	\mathcal{A}_{nat} FS	\mathcal{A}_{adv} FS
ProtoNet	43.26%	0.00%	59.56%	0.00%
R2-D2	55.22%	0.00%	68.36%	0.00%
MetaOptNet	60.65%	0.00%	70.99%	0.00%

Table 10: 1-shot MiniImageNet (MI) and CIFAR-FS (FS) results comparing naturally trained meta-learners. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack.

A.2 Additional experiments comparing robust meta-learning and robust transfer learning

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat} Transfer	\mathcal{A}_{adv} Transfer	\mathcal{A}_{nat} Meta	\mathcal{A}_{adv} Meta
ProtoNet	45.98%	35.63%	63.53%	40.11%
R2-D2	53.26%	33.33%	69.25%	44.80%
MetaOptNet	60.72%	35.11%	71.07%	43.79%

Table 11: Adversarially trained transfer learning and adversarially queried meta-learning on 5-shot CIFAR-FS. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack. Top natural and robust accuracy for each architecture is bolded.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat} Transfer	\mathcal{A}_{adv} Transfer	\mathcal{A}_{nat} Meta	\mathcal{A}_{adv} Meta
MAML	25.84%	15.52%	21.42%	17.9%
ProtoNet	25.58%	18.06%	33.31%	17.69%
R2-D2	27.88%	17.72%	37.91%	20.59%
MetaOptNet	34.71%	16.01%	43.74%	18.37%

Table 12: Adversarially trained transfer learning and adversarially queried meta-learning on 1-shot Mini-ImageNet. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack. Top natural and robust accuracy for each architecture is bolded.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat} Transfer	\mathcal{A}_{adv} Transfer	\mathcal{A}_{nat} Meta	\mathcal{A}_{adv} Meta
ProtoNet	35.15%	26.25%	42.33%	26.48%
R2-D2	38.15%	26.78%	52.38%	32.33%
MetaOptNet	42.98%	25.37%	53.27%	30.74%

Table 13: Adversarially trained transfer learning and adversarially queried meta-learning on 1-shot CIFAR-FS. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack. Top natural and robust accuracy for each architecture is bolded.

A.3 Additional experiments comparing adversarial querying to both adversarial support and adversarial querying during training

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat}	\mathcal{A}_{adv}	$\mathcal{A}_{nat(AT)}$	$\mathcal{A}_{adv(AT)}$
MAML (naturally trained)	91.50%	68.46%	91.60%	74.66%
MAML adv. query	91.11%	88.72%	91.31%	89.01%
MAML adv. query and support	90.58%	82.23%	91.36%	88.97%
ADML	91.99%	86.87%	92.24%	87.35%

Table 14: Performance on 1-shot Omniglot. Robust accuracy, \mathcal{A}_{adv} , is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack. $\mathcal{A}_{nat(AT)}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{adv(AT)}$ are natural and robust test accuracy with 7-PGD training during fine-tuning.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat}	\mathcal{A}_{adv}	$\mathcal{A}_{nat(AT)}$	$\mathcal{A}_{adv(AT)}$
MAML (naturally trained)	45.04%	0.03%	33.18%	0.20%
MAML adv. query	21.42%	17.9%	21.23%	17.87%
MAML adv. query and support	22.39%	19.07%	22.06%	19.14%
ADML	26.68%	16.63%	27.34%	17.78%

Table 15: Performance on 1-shot Mini-ImageNet. Robust accuracy, \mathcal{A}_{adv} , is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack. $\mathcal{A}_{nat(AT)}$ and $\mathcal{A}_{adv(AT)}$ are natural and robust test accuracy with 7-PGD training during fine-tuning.

A.4 Meta-TRADES experiments

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat} MI	\mathcal{A}_{adv} MI	\mathcal{A}_{nat} FS	\mathcal{A}_{adv} FS
$1/\lambda = 1$	56.02%	30.96%	66.29%	45.59%
$1/\lambda = 3$	51.51%	32.30%	61.41%	46.54%
$1/\lambda = 6$	34.29%	22.04%	58.32%	45.89%
AQ	57.87%	31.52%	69.25%	44.80%

Table 16: 5-shot Mini-ImageNet (MI) and CIFAR-FS (FS) results comparing meta-TRADES to adversarial querying (AQ). All models are based on R2-D2. λ is the parameter for TRADES loss. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat} MI	\mathcal{A}_{adv} MI	\mathcal{A}_{nat} FS	\mathcal{A}_{adv} FS
R2-D2 AQ	37.91%	20.59%	52.38%	32.33%
R2-D2 TRADES ($1/\lambda = 1$)	39.11%	20.25%	48.77%	31.99%
R2-D2 TRADES ($1/\lambda = 6$)	34.27%	22.00%	44.37%	33.55%

Table 17: 1-shot Mini-ImageNet (MI) and CIFAR-FS (FS) results comparing meta-TRADES to adversarial querying. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack.

A.5 Training hyperparameters

We train ProtoNet, R2-D2, and MetaOptNet models for 60 epochs with SGD. We use a learning rate of 0.1, momentum (Nesterov) of 0.9, and a weight decay term of $5(10^{-4})$ for the parameters of both the head and the embedding. We decrease the learning rate to 0.06 after epoch 20, 0.012 after epoch 40, and 0.0024 after epoch 50. MAML is trained for 60000 epochs with meta learning rate of 0.001 and fine-tuning learning rate of 0.01. Fine-tuning is performed for 10 steps per task. We did not perform a hyperparameter search and combined common hyperparameters for PGD training with meta-learning hyperparameters used for MetaOptNet and MAML. Experiments for this paper are performed on a machine with $4 \times$ NVIDIA RTX 2080 Ti graphics cards. Runtime comparisons can be found in Table 25.

A.6 Resistance to other attacks

We test our method by exposing our adversarially queried R2-D2 model to a variety of powerful adversarial attacks. We implement the momentum iterated fast gradient sign method (MI-FGSM), DeepFool, and 20-step PGD with 20 random restarts [6, 21, 19]. Our adversarially queried model indeed is nearly as robust against the strongest ℓ_∞ bounded attacker as it is against the 20-step PGD attack with a single random start we tested against previously. Note that DeepFool is not ℓ_∞ bounded and thus the perturbed images are outside of the robustness radius enforced during adversarial querying. Additional experiments on CIFAR-FS can be found in Tables 18, 19, 20.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{DF}	\mathcal{A}_{MI}	\mathcal{A}_{20-PGD}
R2-D2	7.91%	0.01%	0.0%
R2-D2 AQ (ours)	14.45%	31.87%	30.31%
R2-D2 Transfer	0.42%	24.01%	19.75%

Table 18: 5-shot MiniImageNet results against DeepFool (DF) (2 iteration) ℓ_∞ attack, MI-FGSM (MI) ($\epsilon = 8/255$) attack, and PGD attack with 20 random restarts (20-PGD). We compare R2-D2 trained with adversarial-querying (AQ) to the adversarially trained transfer learning R2-D2 as in section 4.1.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{DF}	\mathcal{A}_{MI}	\mathcal{A}_{20-PGD}
R2-D2	0.00%	0.39%	0.01%
R2-D2 AQ (ours)	14.45%	53.46%	46.57%
R2-D2 AT (Transfer Learning)	1.41%	38.28%	33.17%

Table 19: 5-shot CIFAR-FS results against DeepFool (DF) (2 iteration) ℓ_∞ attack, MI-FGSM (MI) ($\epsilon = 8/255$) attack, and PGD attack with 20 random restarts (20-PGD). We compare R2-D2 trained with adversarial-querying (AQ) to the transfer learning R2-D2 as in section 4.1.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{ResNet}
R2-D2	0.00%
R2-D2 AQ (ours)	59.68%
R2-D2 AT (Transfer Learning)	42.02%

Table 20: 5-shot CIFAR-FS results against black-box transfer attacks crafted on an adversarially trained (transfer learning) ResNet-12 model using 7-PGD. We then test R2-D2 trained with adversarial-querying (AQ) and the transfer learning R2-D2 model on these crafted perturbations.

A.7 Experiments on heads vs. backbones

Model	1-shot MI	5-shot MI	1-shot FS	5-shot FS
R2-D2	20.59%	31.52%	32.33%	44.80%
MetaOptNet	18.37%	28.08%	30.74%	43.79%
MetaOptNet (R2-D2 backbone)	18.81%	24.68%	29.57%	41.90%
ProtoNet (R2-D2 backbone)	18.24%	28.39%	26.48%	40.59%

Table 21: Robust test accuracy of adversarially queried R2-D2, MetaOptNet, and the MetaOptNet and heads with R2-D2 backbone on Mini-ImageNet (MI) CIFAR-FS (FS) datasets. Robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack.

Model	1-shot MI	5-shot MI	1-shot FS	5-shot FS
R2-D2	55.22%	73.02%	68.36%	82.81%
MetaOptNet	60.65%	78.12%	70.99%	84.11%
MetaOptNet (R2-D2 backbone)	55.78%	73.15%	68.37%	82.71%

Table 22: Natural test accuracy of naturally trained R2-D2, MetaOptNet, and the MetaOptNet head with R2-D2 backbone on the Mini-ImageNet (MI) and CIFAR-FS (FS) data sets.

A.8 Experiments on alternatives to adversarial training

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat}	\mathcal{A}_{adv}
R2-D2	73.02%	0.00%
R2-D2 AQ	57.87%	31.52%
R2-D2 AQ Denoising	57.68%	31.14%

Table 23: 5-shot MiniImageNet results for our highest performing R2-D2 with feature denoising blocks. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack. Top robust accuracy is bolded.

Model	\mathcal{A}_{nat}	\mathcal{A}_{adv}
R2-D2	82.81%	0.00%
R2-D2 AQ (ours)	69.25%	44.80%
R2-D2 with SR defense	35.15%	23.00%
R2-D2 with DefenseGAN	35.15%	28.05%

Table 24: 5-shot CIFAR-FS results comparing the superresolution defense (SR defense) and DefenseGAN. \mathcal{A}_{nat} and \mathcal{A}_{adv} are natural and robust test accuracy, respectively, where robust accuracy is computed with respect to a 20-step PGD attack. Both methods perform worse than their adversarially queried counterpart. Top robust accuracy is bolded.

A.9 PGD attack

A.10 Runtime Comparisons

In this section, we compare the training speeds of adversarially queried models to their naturally meta-learned counterparts. See Table 25.

Model	Clean	AQ
ProtoNet	0.0472	0.0650
R2-D2	0.0672	0.18167
MetaOptNet	0.3256	1.5425

Table 25: Hours elapsed per epoch of training on 4 NVIDIA RTX 2080 Ti graphics cards.

Algorithm 3 PGD Attack

Require: network, F_θ , input data, (\mathbf{x}, y) , number of steps, n , step size, γ , and attack bound, ϵ .

Initialize $\delta \in \mathcal{B}_\epsilon(\mathbf{x})$ randomly

for $i = 1, \dots, n$ **do**

 Compute $g = \text{sign}(\nabla_\delta \mathcal{L}_\theta(\mathbf{x} + \delta, y))$.

 Update $\delta = \delta + \gamma g$.

if $\|\delta\|_p > \epsilon$ **then**

 Project δ onto the surface of $\mathcal{B}_\epsilon(\mathbf{x})$.

end if

if $\text{argmax} F_\theta(\mathbf{x} + \delta) \neq y$ **then**

 break

end if

end for

return perturbed image $\mathbf{x} + \delta$
