We sincerely thank all the reviewers for their detailed comments, which will be very helpful in improving the paper when we revise it.

Reviewers 1 & 4: Incentives and truthfulness

In classical social choice, truthfulness is often seen as a nonstarter due to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossiblity theorem, and a subsequent result of Gibbard (1977) that applies to randomized rules. However, these results only hold when voters have (and are asked to report) ranked preferences.

Elicitation of cardinal utilities through truthful *non-direct-revelation* mechanisms (which ask voters to submit votes in some format other than directly report their utilities) is not as well studied and could lead to interesting future work.

Reviewer 3: Relevance to NeurIPS

At the risk of being subjective, we would like to point out that the scope of NeurIPS has widened in the last few years, as the conference has become a nexus of AI research. Moreover, the NeurIPS audience has long had an interest in computational social choice. For example, the following computational social choice papers were published in NeurIPS; they do not study the dynamics of learning (nor, for that matter, deal with learning at all), but rather focus on good/optimal decisions in AI systems and beyond.

1. Magdon-Ismail and Xia. “A Mathematical Model for Optimal Decisions in a Representative Democracy.” NeurIPS-2018.
2. Procaccia and Shah. “Is Approval Voting Optimal Given Approval Votes?” NeurIPS-2015.
3. Jiang et al. “Diverse Randomized Agents Vote to Win.” NeurIPS-2014.
4. Azari Soufiani et al. “ A Statistical Decision-Theoretic Framework for Social Choice.” NeurIPS-2014 (oral presentation).
5. Azari Soufiani et al. “Random Utility Theory for Social Choice.” NeurIPS-2012.

Reviewer 3: Threshold voting

The reviewer points to a paper about “threshold voting,” but this is a very different idea. The author is interested only in the case where each voter submits a plurality vote, and a “threshold voting method with threshold t” aims to find some alternative which is voted for by at least t of the voters. This is less interesting from the computational and informational viewpoints; the author is instead interested in efficient hardware implementations of this method.